EU cybersecurity capacity building in the Mediterranean and the Middle East by Lannon, Erwoan
Pa
no
ra
m
a
St
ra
te
gi
c 
Se
ct
or
s 
| S
ec
ur
it
y 
&
 P
ol
it
ic
s
IE
M
ed
. M
ed
ite
rr
an
ea
n 
Ye
ar
bo
ok
 2
01
9
24
0
Strategic Sectors | Security & Politics
EU Cybersecurity Capacity Building in 
the Mediterranean and the Middle East
Erwan Lannon 
Professor  
Ghent University
Cyberthreats on the Rise
The 2008 Report on the implementation of the Euro-
pean Security Strategy included “cybersecurity” for 
the first time among the priorities of the EU’s external 
action, stating that: “modern economies are heavily 
reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, 
communication and power supplies, but also the In-
ternet.” If the EU Strategy for a Secure Information 
Society, adopted two years before, already addressed 
“cybercrime,” the proliferation of cyber-attacks “against 
private or government IT systems” gave the spread of 
cyber-capabilities a “new dimension, as a potential 
new economic, political and military weapon.”1 
An EU Cybersecurity Strategy was adopted in 20132 
followed, in 2016, by a first EU “Directive on Security 
of Network and Information Systems,” known as the 
“NIS Directive,”3 which harmonized the EU Member 
States’ legislations. The EU thus created a political 
and legal framework for tackling this issue. As ex-
plained by Elaine Fahey, the EU Council put forward 
the concept of “cybercrime,” alongside “cyberse-
curity,” to also focus on the “regulatory process” for 
achieving “cyber resilience,” and in order to link the 
EU’s strategy with the Council of Europe’s “Buda-
pest Convention” (n° 185) on “cybercrime.”4 
The external dimension of this internal strategy de-
veloped almost simultaneously. At the security level, 
international cooperation is conducted with NATO 
allies, neighbours and partners,5 notably in terms of 
joint exercises and training.6 In 2017, the EU also 
had “cyber dialogues” with the US, China, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and India.7 
In 2018-19, the EU’s approach in the Mediterranean 
in terms of cybersecurity has mainly been based on 
the priorities adopted in 2015 for the mid-term re-
view of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
which reinforced its security dimension, reflecting the 
priorities of the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy on For-
eign and Security Policy (EUGS8). The adoption in 
2018 of the “EU Cybersecurity Act” is another impor-
tant step, of specific interest for some Mediterranean 
Partner Countries (MPCs).
1 EU COUNCIL, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, Brussels, 11 De-
cember 2008, S407/08, p. 5. 
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND HIGH REPRESENTATIVE JOINT COMMUNICATION, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and 
Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7 February 2013, JOIN (2013) 1 final.
3 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of se-
curity of network and information systems across the Union, EU OJ L 194, 19 July 2016, pp. 1-30.
4 FAHEY, Elaine, “The EU’s Cybercrime and Cyber-Security Rule-Making: Mapping the Internal and External Dimensions of EU Security,” Eu-
ropean Journal of Risk Regulation, Vol. 1/2014 pp. 46-61.
5 See LÉTÉ, Bruno, “EU-NATO Cybersecurity and Defense Cooperation: From Common Threats to Common Solutions” GMF Policy Brief, 15 
December, 2017 www.gmfus.org/publications/eu-nato-cybersecurity-and-defense-cooperation-common-threats-common-solutions.
6 NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994 and “currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Alge-
ria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia,” www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm?.
7 Joint Communication on “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU,” Brussels, 13 September 2017, 
JOIN/2017/0450 final.
8 Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016 http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_
web.pdf.
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The External Impact of the Development of 
the EU’s Cybercapacities 
As mentioned in the 2016 EUGS, at the internal level 
the EU increases its focus on cyber security “equip-
ping the EU and assisting Member States in protect-
ing themselves against cyber threats while maintain-
ing an open, free and safe cyberspace.” 
The EU is now developing a “Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox” designed 
to respond to attacks through 
sanctions, international cooperation, 
dialogue, capacity building, joint 
investigations, etc.
The December 2018 Cybersecurity Act first rein-
forced the mandate of the EU Network and Infor-
mation Security Agency (ENISA9), the “EU Agency 
for Cybersecurity,” to better support Member States 
in tackling cybersecurity threats and attacks,10 while 
contributing to the development of a “culture of NIS 
in society.”11 Secondly, it created an “EU frame-
work for cybersecurity certification” for “products, 
processes and services” that will be “valid through-
out the EU.” It is, therefore, internal market legis-
lation,12 meaning that the Commission, which is in 
charge of the digital single market initiative, will pro-
mote cooperation among Member States and is also 
responsible for “research and industrial collabora-
tion” and “certification of digital products and ser-
vices to ensure safe use.”13 This is therefore impor-
tant for MPCs like Tunisia or Morocco, which may 
reach Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agree-
ments. The possibility that ENISA offers for MPCs 
to participate in EU programmes and agencies, with 
conditions and on a case-by-case basis, is also worth 
highlighting.
Also of importance in terms of defence, is that 
the 2017 first Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO), concerning common security and de-
fence policy, included, as of March 2018, projects 
related to “Cyber Threats,” an “Incident Response 
Information Sharing Platform,” “Cyber Rapid Re-
sponse Teams” and “Mutual Assistance in Cyber 
Security.”14 
Reinforcing the EU’s “Cyber Diplomacy 
Toolbox” 
At the external level, the 2016 EUGS stressed the 
need for the EU to enhance its cybersecurity coop-
eration with “core partners such as the US and NATO” 
and to develop a “common cyber security culture.”15 
The reference to the US and NATO is of crucial im-
portance given the “collective defence” assistance 
clause of the Washington Treaty.16 In this regard, 
NATO’s “very first Cyber Defence Policy” was adopt-
ed in 2008. Eight years later, an EU-NATO Joint 
declaration emphasized the need to help “neigh-
bours and partners” to build a “defence and secu-
rity capacity” and foster their “resilience” in the “East 
and South.”17 
9 See: www.enisa.europa.eu and European Commission, EU negotiators agree on strengthening Europe’s cybersecurity, December 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/cybersecurity-act-2018-dec-11_en11.
10 ENISA was set up to help reach a “high level of network and information security (NIS)” within the EU, including cybersecurity exercises and 
strategies, and data protection issues. Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 es-
tablishing the European Network and Information Security Agency, EU OJ L 77, 13 March 2004, p. 1.
11 ENISA, June 2019, www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa.
12 European Commission, EU negotiators agree on strengthening Europe’s cybersecurity, op. cit.
13 EU ISS, Estonian Presidency of the Council, Hybrid threats and the EU - State of play and future progress, Conference Report, 2017, www.
iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/EE%20hybrid%20event%20report.pdf.
14 EU Council, Updated list of PESCO projects, 19 November 2018, www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37028/table-pesco-projects.pdf.
15 Op. cit., pp. 21-22.
16 On the potential invocation of Article 5 see: MISSIROLI, Antonio, “The Cyberhouse Rules: Resilience, Deterrence and Defence in Cyberspace,” 
ISPI Commentary, 2 March 2018, www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/cyberhouse-rules-resilience-deterrence-and-defence-cyberspace-20378.
17 EU-NATO Joint Declaration adopted by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secre-
tary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Press Release (2016) 119, Warsaw, 8 July 2016, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_133163.htm.
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Furthermore, the EU is now developing a “Cyber Di-
plomacy Toolbox” designed to respond to attacks 
through sanctions, international cooperation, dia-
logue, capacity building, joint investigations, etc. 
In June 2017, the EU Council stressed that all the 
EU’s “diplomatic efforts should aim, as a matter of 
priority, to promote security and stability in cyber-
space through increased international cooperation” 
and that Common Foreign and Security Policy meas-
ures “including, if necessary, restrictive measures,” 
are “suitable for a Framework for a joint EU diplo-
matic response to malicious cyber activities.” At 
the same time, the EU should “encourage cooper-
ation, facilitate mitigation of immediate and long-
term threats, and influence the behaviour of poten-
tial aggressors in the long term.” The EU Council 
then urged Member States to “give full effect to the 
development of a Framework for a joint EU diplo-
matic response to malicious cyber activities.”18 The 
2017 Joint Communication on “Resilience, Deter-
rence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity 
for the EU”19 therefore introduced a specific point on 
the “strengthening of international cooperation on cy-
bersecurity” referring, among the priorities, to: 
— the development of “regional confidence-build-
ing measures”;
— ensuring that cybersecurity “does not become 
a pretext for market protection and the limitation 
of fundamental rights and freedoms, including 
the freedom of expression and access to infor-
mation”; 
— “modernizing EU export controls, including the 
introduction of export controls on critical cyber-
surveillance technologies that could cause hu-
man rights violations or be misused against the 
EU’s own security, and stepping up dialogues 
with third countries to promote global conver-
gence and responsible behaviour in this area.” 
This last priority is of specific interest for relation-
ships between some Member States and MPCs.20
The EU’s Cybersecurity Capacity Building 
in the Mediterranean and the Middle East
The 2017 Joint Communication included in its key 
actions, supporting “third countries’ ability to address 
cyberthreats.” It is clearly stated that the priorities for 
capacity-building will be the “EU’s neighbourhood 
and developing countries experiencing fast growing 
connectivity and rapid development of threats.” In 
this regard, a dedicated “EU Cyber Capacity Build-
ing Network should be set up, bringing together the 
EEAS, Member States’ cyber authorities, EU agen-
cies, Commission services, academia and civil socie-
ty.” Moreover; “EU Cyber Capacity Building guide-
lines” are to be developed for “better political guidance 
and prioritization of EU efforts in assisting the third 
countries.” Indeed, some Mediterranean partners lack 
proper cyber defence capabilities and their infrastruc-
tures are vulnerable. As an example of the growing 
cyberthreats, we could recall a cyberattack called “Tri-
ton,” named after a malware. The latter was developed 
to “manipulate Schneider Electric’s Triconex Safety 
Instrumented System (SIS) control systems - emer-
gency shutdown systems - and was discovered on 
the network of a critical infrastructure operator in the 
Middle East.” Specialized reports pointed out that the 
18 EU COUNCIL, Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities (“Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox”), 
Brussels 7 June 2017.
19 Brussels, 13 September 2017, JOIN(2017) 450 final.
20 For a recent example see: FIDH, Egypt: a repression made in France: Exports of Weapons and Surveillance Technologies, Report n°716a, 
2 July 2018, www.fidh.org/en/issues/litigation/egypt-a-repression-made-in-france.
“EU Cyber Capacity Building 
guidelines” are to be developed 
for “better political guidance 
and prioritization of EU efforts 
in assisting the third countries.” 
Indeed, some Mediterranean 
partners lack proper cyber defence 
capabilities and their infrastructures 
are vulnerable
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“group of pirates behind Triton - suspected of links 
with Russia - remains active.”21
It is therefore no surprise that, among the seven main 
priority areas devoted to security in the November 
2015 Joint Communication on the mid-term review 
of the ENP, “fighting cybercrime” is in a good posi-
tion.22 That also means that, beyond cybersecurity, 
a focus on legislation approximation or at least reg-
ulatory convergence is included in cooperation with 
ENP partners. 
Cyberthreats are like environmental 
issues: they do not take into 
consideration political borders, 
as they are by nature transnational 
and transregional
On a security level, new programmes and actions 
have also been launched. The 2018 report on Euro-
Jordanian relations stressed, for example, that the EU 
programme on the fight against violent extremism 
had been finalized, and that several projects had 
been implemented in the framework of sectors like 
“crisis management,” or “capacity building of public 
security.” Projects like the “EU/MENA Counter-Ter-
rorism Training Partnership 2 (CEPOL CT 2)” and the 
old Euromed Justice (“ICSP CT Mena ENI EUROMED 
Justice IV”) and Police programmes were mentioned 
together with “CyberSouth” (“Cooperation on cy-
bercrime in the Southern Neighbourhood”), which is 
a joint project of the EU and the Council of Europe23 
aimed at strengthening “legislation and institutional 
capacities on cybercrime and electronic evidence” 
in the Southern Neighbourhood, “in line with human 
rights and rule of law requirements.” The “initial pri-
ority areas” are: Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco 
and Tunisia, and the project focuses on “legislation; 
specialized services and interagency, as well as 
public/private cooperation; judicial training; interna-
tional cooperation” and “strategic priorities on cy-
bercrime and electronic evidence.”24
Another example is that the EU and Lebanon have 
developed an “Action Plan to enhance the cyber se-
curity capabilities of internal security forces.” This is 
part of a “Regional Development Agenda” titled “CT 
MENA Counter-Terrorism in the Middle East and 
North Africa” (2017-2020)25. It is aimed at develop-
ing “criminal justice capacity” to counter terrorism 
“across intelligence, law enforcement and criminal 
justice components under the rule of law.” This is 
achieved through institutional capacity, “coordina-
tion and cooperation” and expertise.26 Nine mem-
bers of the Arab League are currently involved.27  
Conclusion 
Cyberthreats are like environmental issues: they do 
not take into consideration political borders, as they 
are by nature transnational and transregional. As 
stated during the preparation of a cyber exercise for 
European defence ministers in 201728: “As the cy-
bersphere doesn’t discriminate, the number of po-
tential targets is equivalent to the number of systems 
and their access points used.”29 Cybersecurity is 
becoming a major sector for cooperation, not only in 
21 ZDNET, Cybersécurité: les principales leçons de la cyberattaque Triton, 3 May 2019, www.zdnet.fr/actualites/cybersecurite-les-principales-
lecons-de-la-cyberattaque-triton-39884243.htm.
22 The other six being: Security sector reform; Tackling terrorism and preventing radicalization; Disrupting organized crime; Chemical, Biolog-
ical, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation; Common Security and Defence Policy; and Crisis management and response. Joint Communi-
cation: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 18 November 2015, JOIN (2015) 50 final.
23  Joint Staff Working Document, Report on EU-Jordan relations in the framework of the revised ENP (2017-2018), SWD (2018) 485 final, 29 
November 2018, p. 3.
24 See: www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/cybersouth.
25 EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, Report on EU-Lebanon relations in the framework of the revised ENP (2017-2018), 
SWD(2018) 484 final, 29 November 2018, p. 3.
26 See: http://ct-morse.eu/projects/. 
27 Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia.
28 ENISA. “European defence ministers meet for cyber exercise supported by ENISA,” 8 September 2017, https://www.enisa.europa.eu/
news/enisa-news/european-defence-ministers-meet-for-cyber-exercise-supported-by-enisa. 
29 EU presidency, “Estonia stages cybersecurity exercise for EU defense ministers,” 7 September 2017 https://news.err.ee/617176/estonia-
stages-cybersecurity-exercise-for-eu-defense-ministers.
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financial or trade terms, but also as an indicator of 
the depth of the political/security relation and trust 
between partners. In the Mediterranean it is already 
a major issue, as demonstrated by the electronic war 
being waged in Syria. As underlined by Edwin Gro-
he, the “cyber element of the Syrian civil war has had 
a more important role than one might have expected,” 
and we “will observe a constant cyber ‘arms race’ in 
which nation-states try to increase their capabilities 
of cyber-attack, exploitation and espionage, as well as 
their cybersecurity capability to defend against those 
very same operations.”30 
Although approximating legislation on cybercrime 
at the pan-euro level is indispensable, it is currently 
not sufficient. Given the rise of cyberthreats, there is 
a need for a “Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Cybersecu-
rity Strategy” (or “PEMCS”), not only for the public 
sector and critical infrastructures,31 but also to help 
economic operators facing growing challenges in 
terms of cyberthreats. Research and technological 
tools are also of crucial importance.32 
Cybersecurity is becoming a major 
sector for cooperation, not only in 
financial or trade terms, but also 
as an indicator of the depth of the 
political/security relation and trust 
between partners
The adoption, in 2018, of the EU Cybersecurity 
Act33 is of specific interest for the MPCs as it also 
includes an article 42 related to “Cooperation with 
third countries and international organizations,” which 
states that ENISA “may establish working arrange-
ments with the authorities of third countries and inter-
national organizations.” Even if these arrangements 
“shall not create legal obligations incumbent on the 
Union and its Member States,” it is an opportunity 
not to be missed by some Mediterranean Partner 
Countries.
30 GROHE, Edwin. The Cyber Dimensions of the Syrian Civil War, Implications for Future Conflict, 2015, Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Laboratory LLC, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a620195.pdf. 
31 See: CASSOTTA, Sandra et al., “Cyber Threats, Harsh Environment and the European High North (EHN) in a Human Security and Multi-level 
Regulatory Global Dimension: Which Framework Applicable to Critical Infrastructures under “Exceptionally Critical Infrastructure Conditions” 
(ECIC)?”, 2019, In Beijing Law Review (BLR), Special Issue 12, at press.
32 In this regard, a “public-private partnership for cybersecurity industrial research and innovation” between the EU, represented by the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Cyber Security Organization (ECSO) association was concluded a few years ago. See the European 
Commission’s decision of 5 July 2016 on the signing of a contractual arrangement on a public-private partnership for cybersecurity industrial 
research and innovation between the European Union, represented by the Commission, and the stakeholder organization, Brussels, 5 July 
2016, C(2016) 4400 final.
33 The Act has been adopted but not yet published in the EU’s Official Journal, see: www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-
0151_EN.html?redirect#BKMD-20.
